

Copper: a tariff-driven scarcity premium meets political hesitation

Investment-committee conclusion

Chip view: tactically cautious on copper at the September 11 price anchor; structurally constructive on electrification demand, but not an unconditional buyer at this valuation. No executable cross-exchange arbitrage or implementation-ready short has been established.

Report date: September 12, 2026. Event window: September 3–12; latest usable market anchors: September 11. USD per metric tonne unless stated otherwise. This is a standalone commodity report, not a portfolio allocation or full company valuation. Incomplete source coverage is detailed below.

The September 10 story matters because the market had been paying for copper that was scarce in the right location, not necessarily copper that had disappeared from the world. Anticipation of a future U.S. refined-copper tariff encouraged inventory accumulation in America, reducing availability elsewhere. Reuters then reported that the White House had not decided whether to impose the tariff, partly because of manufacturing-cost concerns. That challenged the incentive to keep accumulating and withholding U.S. stocks. [R1–R3]

Three separate questions determine the investment outcome:

- **Policy:** will refined copper face a new tariff, on what date, on which product codes, and with what exemptions?
- **Physical flows:** will U.S. accumulation slow or reverse, and will released metal actually be deliverable to the regions experiencing tightness?
- **Fundamentals:** will mine disruptions and genuine end-demand absorb any released inventory?

The strongest bearish evidence is the simultaneous price reversal and collapse of LME cash backwardation. The strongest bullish rebuttal is that an unresolved tariff can continue to strand metal in America, while long lead times and electrification support underlying demand. **No decision is not cancellation, and a smaller regional premium is not proof of global surplus.**

For the next one to three months, watch warehouse flows, cash spreads, Chinese physical premiums and the exact legal decision before buying a dip. Over two to five years, favor economically resilient copper exposure only at a price that does not require permanent scarcity pricing. A long-term demand story is not an entry valuation.

1. What happened: the verified timeline

Observation	Evidence	Interpretation
September 9, 16:15 GMT	LME three-month copper \$14,775; intraday high \$14,802.50. Reuters reported tight availability outside the U.S. [R3]	Location mattered; the rally was not presented as solely a demand acceleration.
September 10, 10:00 UTC	Reuters reported no final White House decision on refined-copper tariffs; an official confirmed the June 30 Commerce update had been delivered. [R1]	A policy expectation weakened, not an enacted tariff being repealed.
September 10, 16:01 GMT	LME three-month \$14,239, down 3.5%; earlier session high \$14,875. [R2]	High-to-later-price decline was about 4.28%, distinct from the reported daily move.
September 10, later update	COMEX October \$6.4725/lb, down 5.1%; LME cash premium over three months \$2.50 versus \$58 a week earlier. [R2]	U.S. relative pricing and immediate scarcity pricing both weakened.
September 11, Asian session	Reuters reported Jiangxi Copper shares initially down 11.2%, later about 10%, alongside broad mining declines. [R4]	Equity transmission was substantial; those intraday figures are not closing returns.
September 11 market anchor	Saved Bloomberg data: LME three-month \$14,240; front COMEX 646.95 U.S. cents/lb. [B1]	The next-day anchor remained near the post-headline LME level.

Reuters also reported September 10 SHFE night-session copper at 108,450 yuan/tonne, down 2.9%. Its simple dollar conversion is not an arbitrage comparison with LME: VAT treatment, FX, contract month, grade and local delivery costs require normalization. [R2]

The later September 10 Reuters update supersedes its 13:25 UTC version for that day's quoted prices. They are revisions of one story, not two independent confirmations.

2. The tariff distinction that changes the thesis

Do not read a headline about a 50% copper-products tariff as evidence of a 50% tariff on refined cathode.

The July 30, 2025 proclamation imposed a 50% duty on specified semi-finished copper and copper-intensive derivative products, effective August 1. At that time, it applied to their copper content. Separately, clause 7 called for a June 30, 2026 update to support a decision on possible refined-copper duties of 15% from January 1, 2027 and 30% from January 1, 2028. That clause did not automatically enact those future refined-copper rates. [P1]

Important update to the historical description: primary April 2 and June 1, 2026 amendments were retrieved for this report. The April proclamation changed covered-product treatment to full-customs-value assessment and differentiated product categories, including 50% and 25% rates and exceptions; the June proclamation made further changes. The old copper-content-only description must not be used as a current blanket customs rule. Exact treatment depends on the amended annex, origin and product classification. These amendments do not, by themselves, establish the separate contemplated universal 15%/30% refined-copper duty. [P2-P3]

Reuters' September 10 account says the Commerce review was delivered but its recommendation was not publicly clear, and no final decision had been made. Market speculation also encompassed concentrate, but concentrate and refined cathode are different products. We do not extend a prospective cathode rate to concentrate without a verified legal provision. [R1]

Three economic constituencies:

- A domestic fabricator may benefit from protection against imported finished or semi-finished competing products while preferring low-cost cathode inputs.
- A U.S. mine/refinery may favor protection on refined imports, but the benefit depends on product mix, domestic pricing and capacity, not simply corporate domicile.
- A U.S. industrial user may face higher input costs, working capital and procurement uncertainty. Some can pass these costs on; others lose margin or orders.

This creates a genuine political tension: encouraging domestic upstream supply can make domestic downstream manufacturing more expensive. New mining and processing capacity cannot be assumed to arrive fast enough to offset a near-term tariff.

3. How tariff expectations create real scarcity without destroying metal

A simplified chain is:

Possible future tariff → higher value of metal already inside the U.S. → accelerated imports and inventory retention → less mobile metal outside the U.S. → tighter regional premiums and cash spreads → higher benchmark prices and mining shares.

If policy credibility falls, that chain can reverse. But the reversal is not automatic. Financing commitments, freight, warehouse queues, approved brands, import/export procedures and the option value of waiting can keep metal in place.

Two accounting identities prevent common mistakes:

Global stock change = refined production + recovered secondary supply – end-use consumption, with recycling classified consistently to avoid double counting.

U.S. stock change = domestic refined output + net refined imports – domestic refined use, adjusted for the coverage of the measured stock series.

An import into America is not global consumption. Nor is a movement from an off-exchange warehouse to an exchange warehouse new global supply. Rising reported inventories can coexist with falling unreported inventories; cancelled warrants can remain physically in a warehouse. Registered/eligible COMEX categories, LME on/off-warrant stocks and SHFE stocks must not be mixed indiscriminately.

A useful economic framework is the theory of storage: forward price approximately equals spot price compounded at financing plus storage cost minus convenience yield. A scarce immediately available unit of copper has operational value to a consumer. Falling backwardation is consistent with that convenience yield falling, but financing, positioning and contract conventions also affect the spread. It is evidence, not a complete causal decomposition. [A1–A2]

4. Physical evidence: strong clues, incomplete balance sheet

Reuters September 9 reported COMEX stocks of 797,275 short tons, equivalent to about 723,275 metric tonnes, as of Tuesday. The September 10 story instead reported 696,259 tons in a metric-tonne reporting context. **These are inconsistent reference observations, not a verified one-day inventory series.** The approximately 27,016-tonne difference cannot responsibly be called an inventory draw without checking date, category, unit and revisions. [R2–R3]

Reuters September 9 also attributed to StoneX an estimate that more than 1.2 million tonnes had entered the U.S. since the February 2025 Section 232 investigation. That is a cumulative-flow estimate, not the COMEX stock total and not the quantity available to re-export. [R3]

The cleaner relative-price evidence:

- LME cash-over-three-month premium was reported above \$500/tonne in mid-August, \$41.48 on September 9, and \$2.50 in the later September 10 update. Different observation times matter. [R2-R3]
- Against the September 10 story's week-earlier \$58, \$2.50 is a 95.7% decline in the quoted spread. This is not a 95.7% fall in the underlying scarcity of all copper.
- Copper, aluminium, zinc and other metals fell together on September 10. Macro conditions and risk reduction were confounders; not every dollar of copper's decline can be assigned to tariffs. [R2]

What cannot yet be measured credibly: a fully reconciled LME-COMEX-SHFE-bonded/off-exchange stock panel; current Chinese physical premiums; mine-by-mine disruption losses; contemporary treatment charges; inventory ownership and release commitments. No numerical global supply deficit is asserted in this report.

How large could an inventory release be?

Use the lower Reuters reference stock of 696,259 tonnes only as a sensitivity anchor, not an audited inventory estimate:

Assumed fraction released	Tonnes released	Per month over six months	Equivalent global-use days at an assumed 28m tonnes/year
10%	69,626	11,604	0.91
25%	174,065	29,011	2.27
50%	348,130	58,022	4.54

All release fractions, timing and the 28-million-tonne demand denominator are **illustrative assumptions**, not forecasts or a sourced current-demand estimate. Repeating the 25% case with 723,275 tonnes produces 180,819 tonnes, about 3.9% more.

At \$14,240, 174,065 tonnes has a gross metal value of about \$2.48 billion. This is not economic profit or a market-cap impact. The same volume can have a disproportionate price effect when marginal inventories are low, but price elasticity is not established here. For scale only, against a hypothetical 200,000-tonne annual deficit it would represent 87%; no such deficit has been verified.

Critical distinction: if U.S. imports merely slow, non-U.S. availability may improve even before U.S. warehouses show exports. Waiting only for a visible U.S. stock draw could miss the turning point.

5. Is there a COMEX-LME trade left?

The saved Bloomberg September 11 snapshot provides the following reproducible arithmetic. Retrieval was September 12 at 18:06:41 UTC; this report's later re-pull failed, so these are explicitly saved observations, not refreshed quotes. [B1]

Instrument	Saved quote	USD/tonne equivalent	Indicative difference vs LME 3-month
LME three-month, LMCADS03	\$14,240/tonne	\$14,240.00	Reference
COMEX first generic, mapped HGU6	646.95 U.S. cents/lb	\$14,262.81	\$22.81; 0.160%
COMEX second generic, mapped HGZ6	654.80 U.S. cents/lb	\$14,435.87	\$195.87; 1.375%

Conversion: **U.S. cents/lb ÷ 100 × 2,204.62262 = USD/metric tonne.** Bloomberg's September 11 second-generic mapping is December; Reuters September 10 quoted October. Generic rank and vendor suffix are not permanent contract identities.

Neither row establishes arbitrage. Match delivery dates, timestamps, bid/ask sides, location, approved grade and tariff applicability. LME's rolling three-month date is not automatically equivalent to a COMEX monthly maturity. The front-versus-second difference could reflect calendar structure as well as regional pricing.

For an import route, define:

Net edge per tonne = executable U.S. sale proceeds – foreign acquisition cost – applicable duty – freight/insurance – incremental financing/storage – conversion/delivery costs – fees and hedging slippage.

Use the customs valuation basis that actually applies. Duty is not universally the tariff times an exchange futures quote. If both legs are date-matched forward prices, do not add a second full spot-to-forward carry charge already embedded in those prices. Separately account for incremental physical funding and margin funding.

Illustrative landed-cost hurdle

Holding the foreign base at \$14,240 and assuming \$250/tonne of all additional non-tariff costs:

Hypothetical refined duty	Illustrative landed cost	USD/lb	Premium required over base
0%	\$14,490	\$6.573	1.76%
15%	\$16,626	\$7.541	16.76%
30%	\$18,762	\$8.510	31.76%

These are conditional accounting examples, **not target prices**. They hold the world price fixed and assume full duty on that base for clarity; actual incidence, exemptions, domestic supply and demand adjustment can change the outcome. The 15% and 30% rows are not current legal-rate assertions.

Even with no tariff, costs of \$100/\$250/\$500 per tonne require gross premiums of 0.70%/1.76%/3.51%. The observed unmatched front difference of 0.16% is below all three illustrative hurdles. This does not prove every commercial route is unprofitable; it does reject treating the displayed difference as free money.

Notional matching: saved Bloomberg contract sizes are 25,000 lb for COMEX and 25 tonnes for LME. One COMEX contract represents about 11.3398 tonnes; one LME lot represents about 2.2046 COMEX contracts. Whole-contract hedges require residual-risk management. No margin, warehouse eligibility, broker execution or live bid/ask check was completed. [B1]

6. Scenarios: distinguish the regional basis from the world price

No scenario probabilities are assigned; evidence is insufficient to calibrate political odds. The following are competing mechanisms, not equal-weight forecasts.

Scenario	Physical mechanism	Likely relative effect	Evidence needed
Credible cancellation or long deferral	Less incentive to import early or retain U.S. metal; possible re-exports	Bearish scarcity premium; U.S. basis likely compresses, world-price effect depends on actual flows	Final legal action, sustained flow change and easing non-U.S. premiums
Indefinite ambiguity	Option value of retaining tariff-free metal persists	Regional tightness can remain; outright price direction uncertain	Continued U.S. accumulation despite political hesitation

Scenario	Physical mechanism	Likely relative effect	Evidence needed
Refined tariff enacted	Front-loading before the effective date, then changed trade incentives	U.S. premium may rise; ex-U.S. price need not rise proportionately and may soften later	Exact coverage/date; post-effective-date inventory trajectory
Structural supply disappointment	Mine/refinery losses exceed relocated supply	Bullish world copper even if regional tariff premium shrinks	Verified output losses, stock draws and tight physical premiums across regions
Global demand slowdown	End-use orders weaken and stock accumulation becomes unwanted	Bearish global price and miners; downstream benefit depends on sales resilience	Weak orders/utilization alongside broad stock builds

An enacted tariff can initially tighten ex-U.S. availability through front-loading yet later weaken ex-U.S. demand if U.S. imports decline. The direction is horizon-dependent. Buying world copper solely because U.S. import duties rise skips this mechanism.

7. Mathematical risk analysis: what was actually run

A new copper-specific simulation was executed for this report: **100,000 stationary-bootstrap paths**, random seed 2026091221, mean resampling block length 10 trading observations. Calibration uses 759 daily Bloomberg LME three-month log changes from September 4, 2023 through September 2, 2026, excluding the event window. [M1]

Log changes were demeaned and given zero expected log drift. Starting level is \$14,240. The construction preserves historical short-block dependence without assuming the past rally continues. It does not estimate tariff probabilities, equilibrium fair value, or self-financing futures returns. A rolling three-month price series is not a futures total-return index.

Model: $P(H) = 14,240 \times \exp(\text{sum of resampled demeaned daily log changes})$. A second specification multiplies log innovations by 1.5. Means exceed medians partly because exponentiation is convex; that is not investment alpha.

Trading-day horizon	Baseline 5th percentile	Median	Baseline 95th percentile	Worst-5% average price loss
21, about one month	\$13,075	\$14,262	\$15,430	10.6%
63, about three months	\$12,347	\$14,253	\$16,375	16.6%
126, about six months	\$11,669	\$14,253	\$17,358	22.3%

Under the 1.5× volatility sensitivity, the 63-day range widens to approximately **\$11,497–\$17,559** and worst-5% average loss rises to **23.8%**. These ranges quantify historically informed dispersion under specified assumptions; they are not calibrated 90% real-world confidence intervals or bounds on an unprecedented shock.

Baseline probability of finishing below \$14,240 is approximately 49.5% at 63 days, largely by construction. It is not evidence that a copper purchase has a 50.5% chance of success. The model excludes futures roll, collateral return, execution, tax and margin liquidation. Numerical convergence at 25k/50k/100k paths is supplied, but numerical stability cannot validate economic assumptions.

Existing miner analysis: commodity direction is not equity return

The earlier same-day research estimated daily miner returns against market, Brent, copper and U.S. 10-year-yield changes, using 728 common pre-event observations and heteroskedasticity/autocorrelation-robust uncertainty estimates. [M2]

Exposure estimate	Freeport-McMoRan, FCX	Southern Copper, SCCO
Copper beta, controlling for other factors	1.07; 95% HAC interval 0.85-1.29	1.26; interval 1.08-1.44
Equity-market beta in that model	1.30	1.03
September 9-11 total return	-7.24%	-7.23%
Saved September 11 share price	\$71.07	\$193.49
Existing 63-day equity simulation, 5th-95th net return	-28.0% to +41.0%	-26.7% to +40.0%

The equity simulation used its own common-date sample, a cash-like log drift and illustrative 20 bp costs; it is not directly identical to the new zero-log-drift copper-price model. The wide bands reinforce that miners are operationally and financially risky equities, not substitute warehouse receipts. Historical betas are associations, not stable structural elasticities or an executable pair-trade hedge ratio.

Market-adjusted event declines were about -6.73% FCX and -7.02% SCCO, but neither remained significant at 5% after the prior study's multiple-testing correction. Macro controls reduce the unexplained declines further, yet copper itself can be a transmission channel; controlling for it does not identify the total tariff effect. This is descriptive evidence, not a causal estimate. [M2, A3-A4]

8. Winners, losers and where to look for opportunities

Upstream miners: a lower global realized copper price generally pressures cash flow, but cost position, production volumes, byproduct credits, royalties, tax, growth capex and jurisdiction determine shareholder impact. U.S. domicile is not the same as U.S.-realized-price exposure. Projects can gain option value from policy support yet still require years of investment.

A transparent generic operating sensitivity: for a hypothetical producer selling 1 billion pounds annually, a \$0.50/lb lower realized copper price reduces revenue by \$500 million before volume response. At an assumed 30% incremental cash-tax rate, the simple after-tax effect is \$350 million, before royalties, costs, hedges and capex. This is not FCX or SCCO guidance.

Smelters and refiners: do not infer higher margins simply from higher copper prices. Concentrate treatment/refining charges, feedstock availability, power costs and byproduct economics matter. Excess processing capacity can depress treatment charges even when refined copper is expensive. A cathode shortage and a concentrate shortage require different analysis.

Fabricators and electrical-equipment producers: lower input copper is positive only to the extent savings are retained. Indexed customer pricing may pass the benefit through; expensive inventories can generate temporary losses, while lower replacement cost releases working capital. Domestic protection against finished imports can coexist with input-cost relief, but current annex classification must be checked.

Generic downstream math: if copper is 10% of sales in the cost base, copper falls 10%, and half the savings are retained, operating-margin improvement is approximately $10\% \times 10\% \times 50\% = \mathbf{0.5 \text{ percentage points}}$, before inventory and demand effects. A recession-driven copper decline may overwhelm that benefit through lower volumes.

Consumers of grid, transport and data-center infrastructure: cheaper copper can reduce project cost, but transformers, labor, permitting, power availability and other equipment may remain binding constraints. Do not multiply a copper-price decline by total project capex.

Recyclers and inventory holders: economics depend on collection volumes, scrap discounts, recovery costs, hedges and inventory acquisition prices. A large inventory position can be a source of financing stress rather than an automatic source of profit.

9. Actionable decision sheets

A. Outright copper: watch; do not chase the tariff headline

Horizon: one to three months. Current stance: tactically cautious, not an unconditional short.

A more credible bearish entry would combine a final policy decision reducing the incentive to retain U.S. metal, improved non-U.S. availability, and an outright price still assuming persistent tightness. A price decline alone is insufficient. A more credible long entry would combine valuation reset with persistent multi-region physical tightness and verified demand/output evidence after U.S. accumulation slows.

Invalidation of the cautious view: continued tight Chinese and LME physical markets despite normalized U.S. flows; mine losses or demand revisions large enough to absorb mobile stock. Invalidating an outright short is not identical to invalidating a regional-basis short.

B. COMEX versus LME: watch only; no demonstrated arbitrage

Horizon: matched to physical shipment and contract expiry. Enter only if date-matched executable prices clear verified all-in costs plus a cushion for delivery and policy risk. A short-COMEX/long-LME position is a basis-convergence thesis, not necessarily a bearish world-copper position. It can lose if U.S. tariff risk or a local squeeze increases.

Exit conditions must be tied to net executable spread, policy invalidation and remaining delivery time. The 0.16% unmatched displayed difference is not an entry signal. No order, borrow, margin or delivery approval has been obtained.

C. Miners: conditional buying list, not a price target

FCX and SCCO are researched exposure examples, not fresh company-level buy recommendations. The saved prices are \$71.07 and \$193.49, respectively, NYSE/USD. A roughly 7% event-window decline already reflects some repricing; that does not establish fair value. Do not short either solely because a tariff headline changed.

For an existing position whose sole thesis was a guaranteed refined-copper tariff, reconsider that premise. A reduction is conditional on that thesis and the owner's risk objectives; no holdings are assumed here. For a new long, require a company-specific valuation that survives lower copper, realistic capex, and normalized byproduct credits. For a short, verified borrow and company catalysts are still missing.

D. Downstream beneficiaries: screen for retained savings

Seek businesses with durable orders, copper cost exposure, limited compulsory price pass-through, and manageable high-cost inventories. Avoid a blanket "buy industrial users" conclusion: tariff classification and customer contracts can reverse the apparent benefit. No unsupported stock target is assigned.

No trade is the present implementation conclusion. The useful action is to improve the physical/policy evidence and avoid paying for an assumed tariff certainty that does not exist.

10. Monitoring dashboard and decision thresholds

Indicator	Available baseline	Decision rule
Final refined-copper legal action	Reuters September 10: no final decision	Read effective date, product codes, exemptions and transitional inventory treatment; official text overrides political commentary.
Matched COMEX-LME net basis	Unmatched saved front 0.16%; second 1.38%	Act only on executable edge after actual route costs, funding, delivery and stress buffer; no fixed universal percentage.
LME cash minus three months	Reuters September 10 \$2.50/t	Sustained contango plus available-stock builds would support easing; renewed backwardation accompanied by verified draws would challenge it. A single print is insufficient.
COMEX stocks and flows	Reuters observations conflict	Reconcile units/categories/dates first; then assess several consecutive weekly flows and U.S. import slowdown, not merely headline stock totals.
LME/SHFE/bonded stocks	Current reconciled panel unavailable	Multi-region draws despite weaker U.S. absorption favor structural tightness; synchronized builds favor demand weakness or genuine easing.
Chinese physical premiums and orders	Current verified series unavailable	Strengthening premiums plus improving fabrication orders is better long evidence than a speculative futures rally alone.
Mine output and treatment charges	Current verified panel unavailable	Quantify lost/refined tonnes and scrap response; do not infer cathode balance directly from mine headlines.
Industrial user margins and inventories	Company-specific review pending	Buy-beneficiary thesis requires retained savings and stable volumes, not lower copper alone.

Next week: prioritize the exact legal status, reconciled stocks, matched basis and LME cash spread. **Next month:** import/export flow changes, Chinese demand and producer output. **Next quarter:** whether end-use demand absorbs any redistribution and whether proposed 2027 duties actually become law.

Highest value of information: a verified release/flow panel can distinguish physical normalization from wishful bearishness. An actual delivered-cost quote can eliminate a false arbitrage immediately. More simulated paths cannot substitute for either.

11. Red team: strongest objections to the conclusion

“Electrification and AI guarantee a shortage.” They support a plausible structural demand direction, not a guaranteed return from today's price. Timing, grid constraints, substitution, recycling and investment response matter. Conversely, a short-term tariff unwind does not disprove the structural thesis.

“America's stockpile will flood the world.” Ownership, warehouse categories, grade, logistical cost and policy optionality can prevent release. Slower imports may matter more than immediate exports. The assumed 10%/25%/50% release cases are not probabilities.

“Near-zero COMEX premium means the tariff is priced out.” Wrong: the quoted contracts are mismatched and the proposed duty concerns future dates. A distant-policy probability cannot be inferred from a nearby unmatched spread by dividing it by 15%.

“The simulation says \$12,347 is the downside.” Wrong: that is one historical-model percentile, not a hard floor, fair value or stop-loss. Regime shifts, funding stress and forced liquidation can be worse.

“Domestic miners must win from tariffs.” Domestic realized pricing may improve, but global prices, foreign assets, costs and processing constraints complicate the outcome. Domestic fabricators may prefer input exemptions. Winners must be identified at the product and contract level.

12. Sources, provenance and limitations

Reuters: full-text archive, refreshed September 12

- [R1] Jarrett Renshaw and Ernest Scheyder, "White House copper tariff plan stalls amid affordability concerns, sources say," September 10, 2026, 10:00 UTC. Story ID: urn:newsml:reuters.com:20260910:nL1N4510XE:3.
- [R2] Polina Devitt, "METALS-Copper falls after report of White House hesitancy over tariff plan," September 10, 2026, 16:42:56 UTC, version 8. Story ID: urn:newsml:reuters.com:20260910:nL8N4520L4:8. Price observation 16:01 GMT; version 7 retained only for audit.
- [R3] Eric Onstad, "METALS-Copper climbs to record high as tightness offsets Middle East worries," September 9, 2026, 16:37:45 UTC. Story ID: urn:newsml:reuters.com:20260909:nL1N45109U:8.
- [R4] Donny Kwok, "BUZZ-Jiangxi Copper leads slide in HK-listed miners as metal prices dip," September 11, 2026, 02:39:01 UTC. Story ID: urn:newsml:reuters.com:20260911:nL1N45302P:1.

Primary policy documents

- [P1] July 30, 2025 copper proclamation, especially clauses 1, 4 and 7.
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/adjusting-imports-of-copper-into-the-united-states/>
- [P2] April 2, 2026, "Strengthening Actions Taken to Adjust Imports of Aluminum, Steel, and Copper Into the United States." <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/04/strengthening-actions-taken-to-adjust-imports-of-aluminum-steel-and-copper-into-the-united-states/>
- [P3] June 1, 2026, "Further Adjusting the Tariff Regimes for Imports of Aluminum, Steel, and Copper into the United States." <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/further-adjusting-the-tariff-regimes-for-imports-of-aluminum-steel-and-copper-into-the-united-states/>

The April/June proclamation bodies were retrieved successfully for this report. Their full annex-level customs mapping was not reconstructed; this report is not an item-specific customs determination.

Bloomberg, internal research and models

- [B1] Bloomberg Desktop API, saved commodity reference response September 12, 18:06:41 UTC; underlying update dates September 11. Securities HG1 Comdty, HG2 Comdty, LMCADS03 Comdty. Fields PX_LAST, LAST_UPDATE_DT, QUOTE_UNITS, FUT_CONT_SIZE, FUT_CUR_GEN_TICKER. LME generic-ticker mapping was not applicable; price/unit fields were present. Overall response partial for that mapping, not a missing copper price.
- [B2] Saved equity anchors September 12, 18:06:43 UTC; FCX/SCCO prices from September 11. Fields PX_LAST, CRNCY, SECURITY_NAME, EQY_PRIM_EXCH_SHRT. Historical data and derived returns retained from the prior run.
- [I1] UCMResearch cached Bloomberg article, April 2, 2026, "Trump Revamps Steel, Aluminum, Copper Tariffs But Keeps 50% Rate." Its covered-product distinction is independently supported by [P2]; it is not a September copper-demand forecast. SharePoint discovery was retried but yielded older metadata rather than a verified fresh industrial dossier. No claim is made that the entire internal research archive was reviewed.
- [M1] New model.py, copper_demeaned_log_changes.csv, model_metadata.json, copper_risk_ranges.csv, convergence.csv, inventory_sensitivity.csv and landed_cost_sensitivity.csv in accompanying package.
- [M2] Prior same-day executed analyze.py/extend_analysis.py, model_metadata, historical/total-return inputs, event_study, factor_exposures and miner Monte Carlo outputs; included for reproducibility and clearly distinguished from [M1].

Academic method references

- [A1] Working, H. (1949), "The Theory of Price of Storage," American Economic Review 39(6), 1254–1262. Used as conceptual storage framework, not numerical calibration.

- [A2] Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. (1987), "Commodity Futures Prices: Some Evidence on Forecast Power, Premiums, and the Theory of Storage," *Journal of Business* 60(1), 55–73. Basis is not a pure expected-return or tariff-probability measure.
- [A3] MacKinlay, A.C. (1997), "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," *Journal of Economic Literature* 35(1), 13–39. Event-window analysis requires a credible expected-return model and attention to confounding news.
- [A4] Newey, W.K. and West, K.D. (1987), "A Simple, Positive Semi-definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix," *Econometrica* 55(3), 703–708. Method used in prior regression uncertainty estimates.
- [A5] Politis, D.N. and Romano, J.P. (1994), "The Stationary Bootstrap," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 89(428), 1303–1313. Method underlying resampling. References identify established methods; no newly retrieved academic empirical finding is claimed.

Coverage and freshness gate

SharePoint: checked, metadata/context limited. HTTP article archive: checked, all 19 matched records in the September 3–12 query reviewed for copper relevance; five directly relevant story records, including one duplicate revision. SQL index: refresh failed with Graph 401. Live LSEG: attempted, partial response returned archived matches and explicitly reported live search failure. Bloomberg: saved September 11 anchors available; current health check appeared connected, but actual reference request failed "Session Not Started."

Therefore this is an evidence-based standalone report with **incomplete source coverage**, not a claim of exhaustive current market access. No invented warehouse panel, political probability, deficit estimate, broker target or live trade quote fills those gaps.

Bottom line: the copper story is a test of whether tariff-driven regional scarcity can unwind faster than structural demand and mine constraints absorb the metal. Be cautious about paying for scarcity; equally, do not short copper merely because tariff certainty weakened. The decisive evidence is actual mobile metal, not the headline alone.

Copper risk visual

